What part did the U.S play in World war 1?

Answer 1

In purely military terms, the United States played a limited role in the war. After declaring war in 1917 they only fought in a handful of battles and only fought about an actual year on the battlefield. The major part that the US played in the war was through the idea that more men would be coming over and the Germans just gave up. Hitler would lead you to believe that the Germans were not defeated but with the amount of troops that the US could send as well as money the Germans would be crushed. Also the US played a crucial role in the peace settlement. It's naval and economic contributions to the war were, however, enormous. They included: Shipbuilding Cox and Ellis _World War I Databook_ gives the following stats (in millions of tons) for US Production of merchant shipping during the war years 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 0.16 0.16 0.38 0.82 2.60 Corresponding figures for Britain were 1.68 0.65 0.61 1.16 1.35 And for Japan (the only other significant builder) 0.09 0.05 0.15 0.35 0.49 So in 1918 the US accounted for close to 60% of _all_ Allied shipbuilding. But in addition to this she made significant indirect contributions. Frex, she refused to export American steel to Japan unless the ships built with it were sent to the Atlantic or Mediterranean, which meant considerably more Japanese ships in those theatres (where the U-Boats were) than had America remained neutral. And American intervention led to that of several other states, mostly in Latin America but also including China, whose declaration of war owed much to US influence. Many of these countries had German merchant ships "stranded" in their ports, which now became available to the Allies. Iirc there were over 40 in Brazil alone. In addition, in March 1918 (Stephenson - he doesn't explain what legal excuse was given) Britain and the US requisitioned around 130 Dutch merchant ships in their ports. This was a substantial boost at a time when the U-Boat campaign was at its deadliest. US support also made it easier to "twist the arms" of neutral merchantmen and keep them coming to Allied ports, when the U-Boat threat might otherwise have kept them away. [Incidentally the Cox/Ellis figures may be conservative. David Stephenson's _1914-1918_ gives US 1918 production as "over 3 million tons", but even the lower figure says enough about the importance of America's contribution in this area.] NavalThe most important aspect of this was in destroyers, which were desperately needed for convoy escorts. By the end of June 1917 there were (Massie - _Castles of Steel_) 28 US destroyers on this duty and by the end of July 37. Stephenson quotes Lord Jellicoe as stating "after the war" that without the US Navy it would have been impossible to introduce convoys in 1917, and at all events transatlantic convoying was not introduced until the US ships became available in late June. (Even this was only for homeward bound ships - it was not extended to outward bound ones until August) This was particularly important as most British oil was from the US and Caribbean (see below), and by April 1917 it was in critically short supply. Inability to convoy could have had disastrous results, as in 1917 sailing "independently", ie _not_ in a convoy, was getting very close to suicide. John Terraine (_Business In Great Waters_) notes that in May-July 93% of all independents were sunk, and in August-October 83%, as against only 1.23% of convoyed ships. As Terraine observes, "Comment is superfluous". Yet even so, lack of sufficient escorts meant that even at the end of 1917, only 50% of merchantmen (though 90% of ocean going ones) were being convoyed, climbing to 90% of all ships by Nov 1918. This would certainly have been a lot harder, and from the looks of things impossible, without the US. Rather annoyingly, Massie doesn't indicate when or where Jellicoe made his statement, but his 1934 book _The Submarine Menace_ is as likely as anywhere. Admiral Sims, _Victory at Sea_ Ch 3, is a bit less emphatic, but not much. "I do not wish to say that the convoy would not have been established had we not sent destroyers for that purpose, yet I do not see how otherwise it could have been established in any complete and systematic way at such an early date." In Ch 4 he goes further, stating "In tonnage of merchant ships convoyed, the work of the British navy was far greater than ours. Yet the help which we contributed was indispensable to the success that was attained. For, judging from the situation before we entered the war, and knowing the inadequacy of the total Allied anti-submarine forces even after we had entered, it seems hardly possible that, without the assistance of the United states Navy, the vital lines of communication of the armies in the field could have been kept open, the civil population of Great Britain supplied with food, and men and raw materials sent from America to the Western Front. In other words, I think I am justified in saying that without the coöperation of the American navy the Allies could not have won the war. Our forces stationed at Queenstown actually escorted through the danger zone about 40% of all the cargoes which left North American ports - -." Just what was at stake here, Sims had indicated in Ch 1, "So far as I could learn there was a general belief in British naval circles that this [German] plan would succeed. The losses were now approaching a million tons a month; it was thus a matter of very simple arithmetic to determine the length of time the Allies could stand such a strain. According to the authorities the limit of endurance would be reached about November 1, 1917; in other words, unless some method of successfully fighting submarines could be discovered almost immediately, Great Britain would have to lay down her arms before a victorious Germany. - - - The Kaiser and his associates had figured the war would end about July 1st or August 1st; and English officials with whom I came into contact placed the date at November 1st - always provided, of course, that no method were found for checking the submarine. " Curiously, I had run into that November 1st date before, but in connection with _France_. Philip Knightley, in _The First Casualty_, asserted that the French government had accepted it as France's last day in the war, if America did not enter. But afaicr (it's a long time since I read TFC) he didn't give a cite for the claim. Clearly, this date proved over-pessimistic as far as Britain was concerned, since it assumed that losses would continue at the April 1917 level, but in the absence of the USN, and with convoying seriously delayed, these would certainly have been far worse than OTL. US participation also allowed a drastic tightening of the blockade, with neutral nations' imports being strictly "rationed" in a way that had not been attempted whilst America was one of their number. The US declaration of war gave the allies near dictatorial control over world trade. As HP Willmott notes, in Feb-Mar 1917 the amount of neutral shipping calling at British ports dropped to 37% of the January level - but by July had recovered to 80% of it. The reason was that with US intervention (plus other states coming in with her) there just weren't enough neutral countries left to keep shipping lines in business. It was a case of doing business with the Allies , pretty much on the Allies terms, or going out of business. With Germany cut off by blockade, and the number of neutrals now so much reduced, the Allies were simply "the only game in town". Raw Materials I've had more trouble getting precise figures in this area, but it was a lot. Stephenson notes that French steel imports from the US in 1918 were thirty times as much as in 1913, and petroleum imports ten times. Regrettably, he doesn't indicate what the 1913 figures were, but the increase sounds substantial. And according to Matthew Yeomans (_Oil; Anatomy Of An Industry_) the US in 1917 was producing 335 million barrels of oil, 67% of the world total, of which about one quarter was going to Europe, so that the US supplied 80% of total Allied oil needs. And in 1917 those needs were getting serious. Massie notes that at the peak of the U-Boat campaign, sinkings of tankers had reduced Britain's six-month reserve of fuel oil to only eight weeks by April. This threatened disaster, as not only the RN's best Dreadnoughts, but its new light cruisers and _all_ its destroyers - essential not only for convoy escort but as a protective screen to shield the capital ships from submarine attack - were oil-burners. Things were so tight that the Grand Fleet was ordered to cruise at only three-fifths of its normal speed, to conserve fuel, and when the first US Dreadnoughts came to Scapa Flow in December 1917, they were old-fashioned coal burners - because the RN _still_ couldn't spare any fuel oil for the more modern ones. According to Sims (Ch 1) "The German U-boats were making a particularly successful drive at tankers with the result that England had the utmost difficulty in supplying her fleet with this kind of fuel. It is indeed impossible to exaggerate the seriousness of the oil situation. "Orders have just been given to reduce to three-fifths speed, except in cases of emergency" I reported to Washington on June 29th, referring to scarcity of oil. "This simply means that the enemy is winning the war." It was lucky for us that the Germans knew nothing about this particular disability. Had they been aware of it, they would have resorted to all kinds of manoeuvres in the attempt to keep the Grand Fleet constantly steaming at sea, and in this way they might so have exhausted our oil supply as possibly to threaten the actual command of the surface. Fortunately for the cause of civilisation, there were certain important facts which the German Secret Service did not learn." I've not been able to find much info about steel, beyond a comment in the _Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page_ that the armies in France were fighting on "American steel" and a remark in Stephenson that US credits to France were used mainly to buy "wheat and steel". Food According to Ambassador Page and others, Britain was in April 1917 within six weeks of running out of wheat, so again a long delay in introducing convoys could have been serious. And in 1918 the Food Administration enabled the US to export three times the normal amounts of breadstuffs, meats and sugar. Presumably most of this went to Allied countries. Stephenson refers to US supplies having seen France and Italy through a "subsistence crisis" in early 1918. Admiral Sims cabled Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels on April 14, 1917, "Mr Hoover informs me that there is only sufficient grain supply in this counry for three weeks. This does not include the supply in retail stores." If this is correct (and Hoover in particular was likely to have known) it suggests that even few weeks delay in US intervention (surely possible assuming no Zimmermann Telegram, or even just a slightly more stubborn President Wilson) could have put Britain in quite serious trouble. Psychology US intervention made a big difference to the _outlook_ for the allies. From then on, essentially the worst that could happen was a somewhat less than total victory. Whatever might befall in the way of U-Boats and/or German offensives, the governments and peoples in the Allied countries (and especially in Britain) knew that all they had to do was _survive_ and sooner or later the US could win the war by sheer weight of men and material. For many reasons, of course, they might not regard this as wholly satisfactory, but the public were were now confident that outright _defeat_ was no longer on the agenda. This made it much easier to maintain morale and turn down any German peace feelers. Without the US, that certainty does not exist. OTL, General Pétain, frex, famously observed that he would "wait for the Americans and the tanks". But if the Americans aren't coming, and curtailed imports of steel and petroleum make the tanks more problematical, what alternative strategy would he have? The timing of the US declaration of war was also a major morale boost for Britain, coming as it did in what proved to be the worst month of thw U-boat campaign. With our food threatening to run out, and no US intervention to reassure us about the future - -. Finance I've seen various figures quoted for total US credits to the Allies in 1917-18, but my scruffy old (1929) _Encyclopaedia Britannica_ gives a figure of $9.5 billion, and is probably as reliable as anything. This was all spent in the US[1] presumably on raw materials. I haven't seen a breakdown of _exactly_ what it was spent on (has anyone?) But would guess that foodstuffs, steel and especially oil figured prominently. It was also vital for maintaining Allied credit in the US, which by 1917 was looking distinctly shaky. In October 1916 a British Treasury Committee (JM Keynes was one of its members), set up to report on how long Britain could go on spending in America at the current rate, did so in tones of less than ringing confidence - "Our financial agents tell us in effect that, by the use of every available device, and possibly at the cost of postponing payments by bank overdrafts, we shall still be solvent on 31st March [1917]. They cannot tell us how this result is to be achieved, but they hope and believe it will be possible". Patrick Devlin, who (in _Too Proud To Fight - Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality_) quotes this report, goes on to note that the French were in the same bind. "France had in October [1916] completely exhausted her gold and dollar resources, and in order to finance her American expenditures for the next six months needed at least £40,000,000 [about $200 million at 1916 exchange rates] from the British Treasury in addition to the sums already promised." The other Allies were even more dependent. Earlier in the year Keynes had observed that Britain had "- - only one ally in this war - France. The rest are pensioners" Burton K Hendrick (_Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page_) says - "Page's papers show that Mr Balfour, in the early stages of American participation, regarded the financial situation as the thing which chiefly threatened the success of the Allied cause. So much greater emphasis has been laid on the submarine warfare that this may at first seem rather a misreading of Great Britain's peril. Yet the fact is that the high rate of exchange and the depredatory U-Boat represented almost identically the same danger. The prospect that so darkened the horizon in the spring of 1917 was the possible isolation of Great Britain. England's weakness, as always, consisted in the fact that she was an island, that she could not feed herself with her own resources and that she had only about six weeks supply of food ahead of her at any one time. If Germany could cut the lines of communication and so prevent essential supplies from reaching British ports, the population of Great Britain could be starved into surrender in a very brief time, France would be overwhelmed, and the triumph of the Prussian cause would be complete. That the success of the German submarine campaign would accomplish this result was a fact that the popular mind readily grasped. What it did not so clearly see, however, was that the financial collapse of great Britain would cut those lines of communication quite as effectually as the submarine itself. The British were practically dependent for their existence upon the food brought from the United States, just as the Allied armies were largely dependent upon the steel which came from the great industrial plants of this country. If Great Britain could not find the money with which to purchase these supplies, it is quite apparent that they could not be shipped. The collapse of British credit therefore would have produced the isolation of the British Isles and led to a British surrender, just as effectively as would the success of the German submarine campaign - -" "- - - The matter that was chiefly pressing at the time of the Balfour visit was the fact that the British balances in the New York banks were in a serious condition. It should always be remembered, however, that Great Britain was financing not only herself, but her Allies, and that the difficult condition in which she now found herself was caused by the not too considerate demands of the nations with which she was allied in the war. Thus by April 6, 1917, Great Britain had overdrawn her account with JP Morgan to the extent of $400,000,000 and had no cash available with which to meet this overdraft. This obligation had been incurred in the purchase of supplies, both for Great Britain and for the Allied governments; and securities, largely British-owned stocks and bonds, had been deposited to protect the bankers. The money was now coming due; if the obligations were not met, the credit of Great Britain in this country would reach the vanishing point. Though at first there was a slight misunderstanding about this matter, the American government finally paid this overdraft out of the proceeds of the First Liberty Loan. This act saved the credit of the Allied countries - - - The first danger that threatened, the isolation and starvation of Great Britain, was therefore overcome .- - -" Page himself wrote to President Wilson on March 5 - "The inquiries which I have made here about financial conditions disclose an international situation which is most alarming to the financial and industrial outlook of the United States. England has not only to pay her own war bills, but is obliged to finance her Allies as well. Up to the present time she has done these tasks out of her own capital. But she cannot continue her present extensive purchases in the United States without shipping gold as payment for them, and there are two reasons why she cannot make large shipments of gold. In the first place, both England and France must keep the larger part of the gold they have to maintain issues of their paper at par; and in the second place, the German U-Boat has made the shipping of gold a dangerous procedure even if they had it to ship. There is therefore a pressing danger that the Franco-American and Anglo-American exchange will be greatly disturbed; the inevitable consequence will be that orders by all the Allied governments will be reduced to the lowest possible amount, and that trans-Atlantic trade will practically come to an end - - Great Britain and France must have a credit in the United States which will be large enough to prevent the collapse of world trade and the whole financial structure of Europe. If the United states declares war against Germany, the greatest help we could give Great Britain and its Allies would be such a credit - - - Of course we cannot extend such a credit unless we go to war with Germany. But is there no way in which our government might immediately and indirectly help the establishment in the United States of a large Franco-British credit without violating armed neutrality? - - - The pressure of this approaching crisis , I am certain, has gone beyond the ability of the Morgan financial agency for the British and French governments. The financial necessities of the Allies are too great and urgent for any private agency to handle - - . It is not improbable that the only way of maintaining our present pre-eminent trade position and averting a panic is by going to war with Germany. The submarine has added the last item to the danger of a financial world crash. There is now an uncertainty about our being drawn into the war; no more considerable credits can be privately placed in the United States. In the meantime a collapse may come." (Interestingly, this letter was written a month _before_ the US entered the war. It looks as if, four days after the publication of the Zimmermann Telegram, British officials were getting certain enough of US intervention to confide in Page about what had hitherto been closely guarded secrets. Judging from Wilson's efforts to pass Armed Ship Bills and the like, they may have been surer of it than he was. Nor is it at all certain that Page's letter had much effect on the President. A few months later he remarked that "Page is really an Englishman and I have to discount whatever he says about the situation in Great Britain." ) Hew Strachan (_The First World War_) puts it differently, but comes to much the same conclusion, noting that "By 1st April 1917 Britain had an overdraft in the United States of $358 million and was spending $75 million a week. The American entry to the war saved the Entente - and possibly some American speculators - from bankruptcy." Stephenson doesn't go quite so far, saying that - "By the time the United states entered the war in April 1917 London had enough gold and securities remaining to finance just three more weeks of purchases and only advances from Morgans enabled the Treasury to meet its obligations in the United States. Although the British could still have covered their dollar requirements without American intervention they would have had enormous difficulty in continuing to bankroll their allies." Quite why the difference between Page and Stephenson I don't know. Possibly Page just didn't distinguish as much as Stephenson between Britain's own needs and her need to support her allies, considering the one just as essential as the other. But that's only a guess. [1] This was a condition of the loans, and would cause some financial headaches later. Britain, in turn, had been making extensive credits to other Allies, but had neglected to impose a similar requirement. So this money did not "come back" into Britain to help us in repaying the US.