What was the style of war the confederate army used?

Answer 1

ANSWER

For the infantry: the criteria of employment were those based upon General Hardee's manual. They were substantially like those of the Union Army and European Armies:

on the forefront a swarm of skirmishers (a quarter of the total force engaged),

about 150 feet behind, a line of infantry, followed after further 250 feet behind by a second line. It was supposed or theorized that, when the unit would be close to the enemy formation, the two lines would have gone beyond the skirmishers, attacking the enemy with the bayonets.

This style of combat would have soon become outdated because of adoption of rifled guns and minié bullets. Anyway, the Confederate infantry would further remain excessively inclined to resolve everything by clash.

For the artillery: still in 1863 the Confederates were inclined to make an obsolete use of the artillery, giving the preference to smooth-bore guns to accompanying fire at closer range. Then, compelled by the high losses and lacking of effectiveness of that arm, due to a.m. adoption of rifled guns, they changed their mind, improving the organization, the equipment and the way of employ. By so doing they led their artillery to reach a very high level, even if it never reached that of Union's.

For the cavalry: since from beginning of war, the Confederate cavalry gave up, soon followed by that of Union's, the obsolete European's criteria of employment and equipment , which would have endured up to the eve of WW1. They were the first to create independent Great Units or Corps of Cavalry, which tasks was of being the eyes and shield of the Great Infantry Units and often of being appointed to act as an army for long range raids behind the enemy lines, striking the Union's line of communications, depots etc., able to effectively fight also dismounted and, in so doing anticipating the great performances of the WW2's large motorized columns.

About the strategy, The Confederates leaders, like their Northerners opponents, were deeply imbibed of the theories expressed by the Baron Anthony Henry de Jomini. Their basic concepts would have strategically dominated their way of warfare almost in the early stage of the conflict. And for most of them (excluding Lee, Jackson, Longstreet and Joseph Johnston and few others), that "domination"

practically endured up to the end of the war, because they didn't realize that those concepts had already become obsoletes and unworthy of being followed.