Terms such as Search and Destroy, Body Count, Village Burnings were slang picked up by the media in Vietnam. Any of which might be part of a patrol in any war.
The US military was often put into a position in which they supported the Army of the Republic of Vietnam through either leadership (advisers), fire support (Artillery or Air), or with conventional ground forces (Infantry). Most problems on a tactical level arise from the political/military organization that the South Vietnamese government had set up. Often times fear that loses(of any kind, even in victory) would make the political situation for the South Vietnamese Government unstable made Vietnamese commanders fear reporting true figures.
The conflicts in the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam have been compared many times and it has been asked by historians how a British force of 35,000 succeeded where over half a million U.S. and others soldiers failed. However the two conflicts differ in several key points.
The MNLA was isolated and without external supporters..
The MNLA was politically isolated from the bulk of the population. It was a political movement almost entirely limited to ethnic Chinese; support among Muslim Malays and smaller tribes was scattered if existent at all. Malay nationalists supported the British because they promised independence in a Malay state; an MNLA victory would imply a state dominated by ethnic Chinese, and possibly a puppet state of Beijing or Moscow.
In purely military terms, the British Army recognized that in a low-intensity war, the individual soldier's skill and endurance was of far greater importance than overwhelming firepower (artillery, air support, etc.) Even though many British soldiers were conscripted National Servicemen, the necessary skills and attitudes were taught at a Jungle Warfare School, which also worked out the optimum tactics based on experience gained in the field.